Street Sleuth
When Even Stock Stars Get Clipped
Demise of Lyceum Capital
Shows Mutual-Fund Skills Can Fail in Hedge World
By HENNY SENDER and SCOTT PATTERSON
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
February 10, 2005; Page C3
Another small hedge fund has died, fueling a debate about whether star
stock pickers from the mutual-fund industry make the best candidates
to run one of these sophisticated, largely unregulated investment
vehicles.
Lyceum Capital manager John Muresianu is winding down his fund only 28
months after starting it. Mr. Muresianu decided to call it quits after
Lyceum, which mainly held technology stocks, suffered a particularly
poor January. At the end of December the fund had $112 million in its
coffers, just a few million dollars more than when it launched in
October 2002 with cash from wealthy families and institutions.
Based in Concord, Mass., Lyceum never really hit its stride. It got
off to a poor start with losses in eight of its first nine months, and
then swings in either direction in subsequent months. Mr. Muresianu
says the stock picks that helped clients last year, such as eBay Inc.,
hurt them in January.
"I had a grand vision of creating an institution that would survive
me," Mr. Muresianu says. "But I bit off more than I could chew. To
manage money is stressful. To manage money and to manage people is
even more stressful. And if you are underwater for much of the time,
it is also very stressful."
Mutual-fund managers who start hedge funds often find themselves
dealing with different investment tools as well as clients who demand
performance for the fees they pay, typically as much as 2% of a fund's
assets and 20% of its profit. Then there is the matter of running a
business in addition to running the portfolio.
"Running money is one thing, but running a firm [and] doing the
marketing is an entirely different thing," says Jacob Schmidt,
director of global hedge-fund ratings at Allenbridge Hedgeinfo, a
London research firm.
Mr. Muresianu was previously a high-profile fund manager at Boston's
Fidelity Investments. Yet some in the industry had been skeptical of
Mr. Muresianu's chances from the get-go. "He thought he could actively
time the direction of the market, which is difficult to do," says
Charles McNally, a managing director of Lyster Watson & Co., which
invests in hedge funds on behalf of its clients. Mr. McNally says he
decided not to steer clients to Mr. Muresianu, citing the fund's
volatile performance.
To be sure, Mr. Muresianu's fund was a far cry from the billion-dollar
behemoths whose failures grab headlines -- and that may have
contributed to its demise. Smaller hedge funds lack the assets and
clout that help convince investors to stick with them during lean
years. Many fail.
Yet hedge-fund launches still wildly outpace closures: Last year,
1,406 funds were launched, according to Chicago's Hedge Fund Research
Inc., while 267 liquidated. The message, industry critics say, is that
it still is easy to set up a fund.
After a short career in academia, Mr. Muresianu worked as a currency
trader for Bank of Boston for two years and then joined Fidelity as an
equity analyst in 1986. In 1993, he was made the portfolio manager for
the Fidelity Utilities Fund and later the Fidelity Fifty Fund. He was
a good stock picker. During his helm of Fidelity Fifty, from January
1999 to June 2002, he delivered an average annual return of more than
9%, compared with a 4% loss in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index
during the same period.
"I am surprised that his fund hasn't worked," Christopher Traulsen,
senior fund analyst at Chicago fund researcher Morningstar, says of
Mr. Muresianu. "At Fidelity, he was a maverick. He ran a very
concentrated portfolio. He had these bets in place that were
aggressive but tempered with a large cash stake."
Too large a cash stake: By 2002, the portfolio of the $2 billion
Fidelity Fifty held 30% in cash, more than three times the limit
Fidelity allows. Mr. Muresianu quit amid pressure from upper
management to put more cash into stocks and started Lyceum.
Mr. Muresianu, who holds a doctorate in history from Harvard
University, previously had compared the Internet boom to the rise of
radio in the 1920s, an analogy that put him into dot-com stocks early
and profitably. But when he started Lyceum he shorted the market --
something he couldn't do at Fidelity, as most mutual funds aren't
allowed to make these bearish bets -- and got walloped. To some
observers, that mistake demonstrated the folly of assuming strong
stock pickers from the mutual-fund industry will be great hedge-fund
managers.
"We shy away from managers coming out of mutual funds," says Charles
Gradante, managing principal of Hennessee Group, a hedge-fund adviser.
"We like managers coming out of Wall Street" who have more experience
with financial instruments such as derivatives.
"You have mutual-fund managers that leave the industry to get into a
hedge fund, and they're out of the business as soon as they're in it,"
adds Joseph Omansky, president of Sky Fund, a hedge-fund research
group based in New Brunswick, N.J. Hedge funds are "much more
statistical [than mutual funds]."
The industry is littered with failures by former mutual-fund managers.
James Otness, a fund manager with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., left in
1998 to start Dolphin Asset Management, which failed in 2000. Spheric
Capital Management, started by Erin Sullivan, another star stock
picker from Fidelity, faded from the scene amid the turbulent 2001
market.
A notable exception is hedge-fund manager Jeffery Vinik, who left
Fidelity's flagship Magellan Fund in 1996. After several years of
outsized returns in the hedge fund he started, he closed shop in 2000,
returning $4.2 billion to clients.
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"You have mutual-fund managers that leave the industry to get into a
hedge fund, and they're out of the business as soon as they're in it,"
adds Joseph Omansky, president of Sky Fund, a hedge-fund research
group based in New Brunswick, N.J. Hedge funds are "much more
statistical [than mutual funds]."
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